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N
orthern Ireland’s peace has 
been imperfect. Violence over 
the constitutional question 
has been accompanied by 
continuing sectarianism, including riots 
over flags and parades. But these ongoing 
discontents have been accompanied by 
political stability since 2007. In the 2006 
St Andrews Agreement, the DUP and 
Sinn Féin agreed to share power at the 
head of the Northern Ireland Executive at 
Stormont. These leading forces of British 
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The greatest threat to stability in Northern Ireland comes from 
dissident republicans opposed to the peace process. But are these 
rejectionists a dying gasp or another phase of a centuries-old struggle 
against British rule in Ireland? Jon Tonge investigates.
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unionism and Irish nationalism have 
cooperated reasonably well (with hiccups) 
on a pragmatic basis, securing the political 
institutions in a seemingly irreversible 
political process. Dissident republicans, 
however, remain determined to reject any 
form of ‘British rule’ in Northern Ireland. 
Dissident Violence
Violent ‘dissident’ Irish republicanism has 
been evident since the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement in 1998. Since then 
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republicans opposed to that deal have 
killed more than 50 people, including 29 
in Northern Ireland’s worst atrocity, the 
Omagh bombing, within months of the 
pact. Since 2006, republicans have been 
responsible for more than 600 shooting and 
bombing incidents and killed British Army 
soldiers, Police Service of Northern Ireland 
officers and a Prison Officer, along with 
several civilians. The official security threat 
level in Northern Ireland has been ‘severe’ 
since 2007. There are nearly 50 prisoners 
on paramilitary wings in Northern Ireland 
and 237 individuals have been charged 
with terrorist offences since 2006. Overall, 
conflict-related deaths in Northern Ireland 
since the Good Friday Agreement now 
number over 150 (Hayes and McAllister 
2013). ‘Spoiler’ groups are common in peace 
processes. Northern Ireland is no exception.
In 2010, the then Head of MI5, Jonathan 
Evans acknowledged that there had been 
a persistent rise in terrorist activity and 
ambition’ in Northern Ireland and that the 
security services had given 
insufficient weight to the pattern of 
history over the last hundred years, which 
shows that whenever the main body 
of Irish republicanism has reached a 
political accommodation and rejoined 
constitutional politics, a hardliner 
rejectionist group would fragment and 
continue with the so-called armed struggle.
The question begged is whether these 
rejectionists represent the last grasp of 
physical force republicanism bereft of utility 
or traction, or constitute another phase of a 
fluctuating, centuries-old struggle against 
British rule in Ireland. Dissidents have 
struggled to sustain their campaign, yet they 
have produced significant violence, even 
if its severity, in terms of death or serious 
injury, is way down on that experienced 
during 1970-98 ‘Troubles’ (see Figure 1, 
above and Figure 2 page 16).
Dissident republicans have, 
overwhelmingly, been the perpetrators 
of violence between 2006 and 2012. The 
rate of shootings and bombings over that 
period runs at 12 per cent of the ceasefire-
free period of the 1980s. Post-Good Friday 
Agreement (i.e. 1999-2012) shootings 
and bombings are at around 30 per cent 
of the level of the 1990s. This is a huge 
reduction – although the Agreement was 
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sold as something better than a situation 
in which nearly one third of shootings and 
bombings would continue. Meanwhile, at 
a post-Agreement average of 132 annually, 
compared to 421 in the pre-Good Friday 
Agreement 1990s, the numbers of persons 
being charged with terrorist offences is also 
running at around 30 per cent of the old rate. 
Despite the greatly reduced violence 
in Northern Ireland, dissidents are seen 
as a ‘major threat’ by a sizeable section of 
the population. A majority of Protestants 
see them as such, although communal 
asymmetry is evident, as only 17 per cent of 
Catholics think likewise (Evans and Tonge 
2012). Violent activity has been considerable 
in some areas, such as Derry, Lurgan and 
Strabane, but much weaker in others such as 
West Belfast, where Sinn Féin continues to 
dominate the local state. 
Who are the ‘Dissidents’?
The term dissident republican is 
unsatisfactory. It is an umbrella label, 
designed to cover a wide range of 
organisations and individuals who object 
to the Westminster government’s claim to 
sovereignty over Northern Ireland (see box 
page 17). They dissent against the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement, which preserved 
that claim for so long as the people of 
Northern Ireland desire the territory’s 
inclusion within the United Kingdom. 
The term ‘dissident republican’ is often 
used to denote difference from ‘mainstream 
republicans’. Yet Irish republicanism 
has taken many forms and no single 
organisation can claim monopoly. Fianna 
Fáil, the dominant party in Irish politics for 
much of the last century, emerged from 
the ‘dissident’ IRA forces opposed to the 
1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty which confirmed 
the partition of Ireland. The Provisional IRA 
which emerged in 1970 was the ‘dissident’ 
republican organisation of its time, rejecting 
constitutional politics, insisting that ‘armed 
struggle’ was necessary against British rule 
in the north of Ireland and condemning 
Fianna Fáil for abandoning republicanism. 
As the Provisional IRA’s armed campaign 
was eventually displaced by Sinn Féin’s 
constitutional politics, so the ‘dissidents’ of 
the 1970s were duly condemned as ‘sell-outs’ 
by modern-day ‘dissidents’. 
Figure 1: Main Dissident killings 1998-2013
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Irish republicanism
There has never been an agreed definition 
of what constitutes Irish republicanism. 
It is a product of a fusion of ideology, 
historical interpretation and contemporary 
circumstances. Most republicans in Northern 
Ireland support Sinn Féin, which has grown 
in size, attracting support from new voters 
and from those who always supported 
constitutional, non-violent methods and 
thus earlier backed the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP). Significant, if 
heterogeneous, opposition to Sinn Féin has 
nonetheless emerged. Disparate republican 
groupings and individuals, lumped together 
under the ‘dissident’ label whilst claiming 
to be ‘true’ republicans, have attempted to 
challenge the dominant Sinn Féin narrative 
on what constitutes republicanism. 
Much support for the Provisional IRA’s 
armed campaign was sustained, not by 
widespread resentment at British rule, but 
rather by British-administered structural 
inequalities in Northern Ireland (Bean 
2007). Accordingly, the eradication of those 
inequalities diminished support for militant 
republicanism. Dissidents appear politically 
isolated and struggle to sustain momentum. 
Sinn Féin’s continuing electoral success 
and condemnation of dissident activity has 
increased the marginalisation of militants. 
Whilst eschewing contemporary violence, 
Sinn Féin has nonetheless maintained a 
strong connection with its previous armed 
‘tradition’ in Northern Ireland through 
commemorative events celebrating the 1916-
2005 IRAs in their various manifestations. 
Questions over when and why violence 
ceased to be a legitimate strand of Irish 
republicanism thus remain.
The Provisional IRA ‘stood down’ in 2005, 
insisting that there was a democratic way 
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forward to a united Ireland under the 
guidance of Sinn Féin. ‘Dissident’ violence 
increased when Sinn Féin’s lingering 
connection with anti-state violence was 
finally severed via the party’s declaration 
of support in 2007 for the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland. This allowed Sinn Féin 
to re-enter government, but led to some 
defections, as from thereon republicans 
would be required to cooperate with 
the police, including ‘informing’ on those 
still committed to the ‘old ways’. By 2009, 
Sinn Féin’s Deputy First Minister, Martin 
McGuinness, had travelled such distance from 
those previous methods that he denounced 
the Real IRA’s killing of two British soldiers as 
an act perpetrated by ‘traitors to Ireland’. 
Som  dissidents question why violence has 
been repudiated short of the ultimate ambition 
of a united Ireland. On this reading, what was 
morally and politically justified by Sinn Féin from 
partition until the close of the 20th century, 
should not be rejected pending fulfilment of 
republican goals. Yet internal friction amongst 
dissidents has led to scorn from mainstream 
Figure 2: Conflict-related violence 
in Northern Ireland 
Sources: Police Service of Northern Ireland (2012); Conflict Archive Information Network (2006).
* Figures are now recorded from 1 April to 31 March e.g. 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012.
** The Provisional IRA was on ceasefire from 31 August 1994 to 8 February 1996 and again from 19 July 1997. 
The main Loyalist paramilitaries called a ceasefire on 13 October 1994. These ceasefires were ‘imperfect’.
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republicans. Dissident republicanism embraces 
an eclectic, heterogeneous collection of 
personnel, ranging from anti-violence 
intellectuals to fundamentalist violent diehards. 
Ideologically and tactically, dissident groups 
have been diverse. They are also amorphous, 
beset by fluctuating memberships, defections 
and splits, existing amid a perpetual fear of 
‘informers’. Tha panel opposite provides a guide 
to non-mainstream republican groups, but it 
should not be regarded as definitive, given the 
fluidity of membership, propensity to fracture 
and the tendency for new groups to emerge 
(Whiting 2014).
Conclusion
Despite claims to the contrary from 
‘mainstream’ republicans, the so-called 
‘dissidents’ do represent historical continuity, 
a strand of irreconcilable republicanism 
impervious to hostility or isolation. In that 
respect, Sinn Féin’s chutzpah in condemning 
violence from the militant space they once 
occupied might be seen as considerable. As 
Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, sister of Bobby 
Sands, the first republican to die in the 1981 
hunger strikes declared witheringly of the 
Good Friday Agreement, ‘my brother did not 
die for cross-border bodies with executive 
powers’. The Provisional IRA’s campaign was 
not about achieving nationalist equality 
within Northern Ireland, but was intended to 
end that state(let)’s existence. 
Yet, the failure of that campaign highlights 
how the ‘state-of-play’ for dissident 
republicans appears bleak, notwithstanding 
that militant republicanism endured similar 
difficulties of lack of support and military 
incapability for much of the 20th century. 
The difference in this century is that some 
of the context has changed. The pursuit 
of Irish unity is neither a constitutional 
imperative nor even part of political rhetoric 
in the Irish Republic. Nationalists now have 
a political stake in Northern Ireland. The 
entity of Northern Ireland still has significant 
weaknesses. Few people identify as ‘Northern 
Irish’ and it remains a polity beset by 
sectarianism. Nonetheless it has endured for 
nearly a century and the flaws of the northern 
state appear less than the weaknesses of 
dissident republicanism.
Aspirations among Irish nationalists for 
a united Ireland remain and it is true that 
this option has never been put before an 
all-island electorate. Co-determination of the 
island’s future, not Irish self-determination, 
underpinned the Good Friday Agreement. 
However, there is less equivocation and 
more condemnation of violence as the 
means of attainment of Irish unity than 
previously. There is also cognisance amongst 
nationalists of the seeming impossibility of 
imposing Irish unity upon reluctant unionists 
without consent within Northern Ireland. An 
episodic republican armed campaign limps 
on uncertainly, as a mainly minor footnote, 
a violent sideshow alongside nationalist 
participation in the northern state. 
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Militant Republican 
Organisations
REAL IRA: Emerged in 1997 in opposition to 
movement by Sinn Féin and the Provisional 
IRA towards the eventual peace deal that fell 
short of traditional republican goals. Merged 
with Republican Action Against Drugs to 
form the ‘New IRA’ in 2012.
32 COUNTY SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT: 
Political ‘associates’ of the Real IRA, 
emphasising the need for Irish self-
determination. 
REPUBLICAN SINN FÉIN: Formed after 
a 1986 split in Sinn Féin over whether to 
recognise the Irish Parliament, it rejects the 
Irish Parliament and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly as ‘partitionist’ legislatures. 
Republican Sinn Féin advocates ‘Eire Nua’ – a 
federal Ireland. A small faction in Limerick 
broke away in 2010 to set up ‘Real Sinn Féin’.
CONTINUITY IRA: Formed soon after its 
political ‘associates’ in Republican Sinn Féin, 
but has carried out few attacks.
1916 SOCIETIES: Mainly northern 
republicans pressing the case for Irish 
national self-determination via an all-Ireland 
referendum on a united Ireland.
ÓGLAIGH NA HÉIREANN: Militarist IRA 
which emerged in 2005.
REPUBLICAN NETWORK FOR UNITY: 
Political grouping formed in 2007 in 
opposition to Sinn Féin’s support for the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland.
ÉÍRÍGÍ: Socialist political group campaigning 
on economic and constitutional issues. 
IRISH REPUBLICAN SOCIALIST PARTY: 
Emphasises socialism and does not endorse 
‘armed struggle’ as the conditions for it to be 
effective do not exist.
IRISH REPUBLICAN VOICE: Left-wing, 
mainly Dublin-based grouping, attempting to 
link national and social issues.
‘Dissident’ groups tend to claim a ‘mandate’ 
emanating from history (i.e. from the dead 
rather than the living). They have struggled to 
gain the community legitimacy or electoral 
support enjoyed by Sinn Féin. The level of 
backing for ‘dissident’ republicans is very 
small, but not entirely negligible. The ESRC 
2010 Northern Ireland 2010 General Election 
survey suggested that up to 14 per cent of 
nationalist identifiers offer some sympathy 
(Evans and Tonge 2012) and several hundred 
votes have been recorded for ‘dissident’ 
candidates in council elections, against a 
broader backdrop of electoral irrelevance. 
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